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Abstract
Over the past decade, the Eurasian countries of the former Soviet Union all underwent similar trans-
formations with respect to education and ethnicity revitalization. Each country has prominent ethnic
populations with strong revitalization agendas who struggled to preserve their language and culture
from assimilation and repression. Upon independence, revitalization efforts, while plentiful, were
hampered by the reality of post-independent multilingual/multicultural populations that forced indige-
nous ethnic groups to contend with both their own revitalization efforts and the often conflicting
agendas of other ethnic groups. Five stages of development that underscored the relationship between
cultural revitalization, language acquisition and ethnic identity are: 1) limited socialization of linguis-
tic/cultural knowledge, 2) vocalization and implementation of linguistic/cultural revitalization,
3) reinforcement of altered minority/majority configurations via language/culture laws, 4) ethnic-based
conflict based on rejection of radical social change, and 5) institutionalization of revitalization agendas.
1 Introduction
Over the past decade, the Eurasian countries of the former Soviet Union experienced
similar transformational patterns in the revitalization of education and ethnicity. This
relationship has historical roots which combined elements of cultural revitalization,
language acquisition, and ethnic and nationalistic identity. In the last decade, education
served three purposes: a) traditional formal education as a means for cultural maintenance
or extinction; b) nonformal education as a means for cultural rejuvenation, and c)
revitalized formal education, which served to define, promote and maintain new and
emerging ethnic identities. This educational impact consequently affected the formation
and adherence to multicultural education throughout Eurasia.
2 Revitalization Foundations
Petherbridge-Hernandez and Raby (1993) delineated four historical eras between 1920 and
1990 through which indigenous ethnic groups in Europe maintained cultural and linguistic
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identity and used that identity to define nationalistic agendas. These eras remained
consistent in the formation of Eurasian cultural awakening in which diverse ethnic groups
used language/culture literacy as a rallying point for defining nationalistic/cultural agendas.
In this process, education’s role in revitalizing linguistic, cultural and nationalistic
socialization was unparalleled, as “education was and remains the primary tool that defined
majority dominance and minority subservience” (Kagedan 1991).
Contrary to the Petherbridge-Hernandez and Raby model, in the final stage of develop-
ment Eurasian countries were not havens in which single ethnic groups achieved cultural
revitalization. Indigenous language/cultural literacy reflected both preexisting and new
forms of ethnic solidarity, and upon independence, strongly united ethnic groups
succeeded in redefining agendas that maintained and enforced revitalization goals.
However, severe economic hardships, ethnicity-based conflicts, and the complexities of
being a multicultural and multilingual state resulted in unexpected inequities that made the
achievement of these goals difficult (Brubaker 1994; Ray & Poonwassie 1992).
During both Tsarist and Soviet periods, the Russian ethnic group constituted the
dominant socio-political and economic group, even in areas where Russians were
numerical minorities. The term “nationals” was given to non-Russians residing within their
own geographical territories. In many regions, local nomenclature of Russianized nationals
(ethnic indigenous) perpetuated a typical center/periphery dependency model in which
ethnic minorities were accountable to the Russian majority, whether locally or in Moscow.
In the post-Soviet era, the legacies of these terms and their applications have changed little.
Inferior indigenous educational attainment echoed societal inequities. Throughout,
Eurasia, a disproportionate number of indigenous people attended and completed higher
education, and an escalating number of ethnic students dropped out of National Schools
before the eighth grade. In 1992, twenty percent of non-Russians attended Russian schools
and yet only two percent attended universities. Lack of education deprived minorities of
desirable jobs and social positions which further limited future opportunities and
perpetuated the poor as disadvantaged. Neither Soviet industrialization nor Russian
privatization policies helped the underemployed who were typically rural indigenous
minorities. As a result, many indigenous people related neither to their own nor to the
dominant culture. This accounted for some being more marginalized in 1996 than they
were in 1917. A continued policy of Russian acculturation further threatened indigenous
groups to the brink of cultural extinction (Batsin 1993; Tkachenko 1993). This pattern is
not atypical in countries where multicultural diversity underscores socio-economic
unbalance and subordination (Ogbu 1993; Teck 1993).
Soviet ethnic policy proclaimed the importance of minority ethnic cultures and
established the National School to help promote “nation building” (Russian, natsionalnoe
stroitelstvo) of titular indigenous cultures. However, reinforcement of cultural legacies was
undermined by limiting education to folk traditions which ignored both quality and
quantity of cultural knowledge. Simultaneously, Soviet policies fostered a “Soviet people”
ideology that blended cultures, histories and alliances of all Soviet peoples under a
common bond of sliyanie (assimilation). Toward this end, conscientious effort was made
to disrupt indigenous identity and to create unique combinations of ethnic groups via
forced migration, disruption of traditional economic and social patterns, intensive
Russification policies, and educational denial and/or misinterpretation of cultural/historical
realities. As a result, many ethnic groups were forced to create and share multicultural
legacies. This resulted in a deliberately created cultural difference, where none had existed
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previously. Indeed, although official policy promoted the concept of unity via the “Soviet
person”, the reality of ethnic differentiation and indeed nationality ranking along an
evolutionary scale from tribe to developed nations persisted (Brubaker 1995; Singh 1995;
Slezkine 1994; Batsin 1993; Tkachenko 1993).
Historically, diverse levels of indigenous economic, technological and literacy existed.
Prior to the Soviet period, non-Russian ethnic groups (Georgia, Armenia, Azerbaijan,
Kazakhstan and Tajikistan) had rich literary histories that spanned centuries. Post
nineteenth century literary histories for Belarus, Moldova, Ukraine and some Central Asian
countries; and rich oral histories with limited or no written history (Kyrgyzstan, Yakutia
and several Siberian ethnic groups) also existed. There is no correlation, however, between
indigenous economic, technological and literacy levels and the intensity of desire for
linguistic/cultural revitalization.
Post-independence, Eurasian countries contended with a multicultural and multilingual
heritage, where the existence of more than one numerically significant minority ethnic
group remained the norm. As multiple ethnic groups articulated revitalization agendas, and
as many indigenous minority groups were transformed into a political majority, cultural
conflict was heightened by conflicting perceptions of whose culture would predominate.
1
In the name of self-preservation, some regions, like Estonia and Latvia, limited the rights of
non-titular indigenous peoples. In regions where the titular indigenous and Russians were
almost numerical equals, such as Kazakhstan, a bicultural/bilingual compromise was
planned. The agendas of empowered minorities in the Republics of Chechnya, Tatar, Tuva
and Saka conflicted with those who preferred to maintain the status quo. Russians labeled
themselves “minorities under opposition” to help support their agendas in Kygryzstan,
Latvia, and the Ukraine. The agendas of other ethnic groups conflicted with both the titular
indigenous and Russians in Moldova between Ukrainians and Russians, in Tajikistan
between Uzbeks and Russians, and among minority Poles who resided in the Ukraine,
Latvia and Lithuania. Finally, several ethnic groups viewed revitalization as a means of
countering their linguistic/ cultural extinction in Armenia, Azerbaijan, Georgia, Siberian
Far East, Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan.
3 Revitalization Development
The bond between ethnic revitalization and language/culture education has historic roots.
Fervent cultural conviction enabled ethnic groups to withstand intense linguistic/cultural
repression. Collective anger over this suppression of heritage emerged in the 1980s as the
cultivation of ethnic revitalization. Matuszewski (1993) claimed that this revitalization
countered “resentment and abandonment felt by long-suppressed peoples” (p. 2). Revitali-
zation development took four forms: 1) Identification of formal educational policy that
promoted cultural maintenance and/or extinction, 2) Emergence of revitalization agendas
via nonformal education, 3) Manifestation of a policy for altered formal education that
serves a new majority, and 4) Cultural conflict resulting from multicultural revitalization
agendas.
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3.1 Formal Education: Agent for Cultural Maintenance/Extinction
Throughout Tsarist and Soviet history, formal education impeded as well as promoted
ethnic revival. Although primary level curricula reflected the cultural heritage of non-
Russians, the overall educational system promoted Russification policies, which under-
mined the socialization of indigenous culture. In this process, the maintenance of Russian
culture contributed to the cultural extinction of many non-Russian ones.
Russification policies began during the Russian empire, and education, when available,
included a Russified curriculum, with Russian as the language of instruction. Although
some schools had multicultural names, few indigenous students were actually enrolled in
them.
2
 Under Soviet rule, non-Russian educational policy (including language policy)
shifted from periods of extreme suppression that facilitated cultural extinction to periods of
limited acceptance that, while still promoting Russification, acknowledged elements of
cultural rejuvenation (Petherbridge-Hernandez & Raby 1993). During the 1920s, the
Korenizatsiia policy included a) development of a parallel school system, Russian and
National Schools (the latter were to help non-Russians maintain their cultural identities), b)
creation of written languages for pre-literate ethnic groups, c) transcription of non-Cyrillic
script into Latin script, and d) limited indigenous language publications. Due to unequal
supplemental resources, languages with developed histories (Armenian, Azerbaijani,
Georgian, Kazakh, Tatar, Ukrainian and Uzbek) enjoyed more language freedom than
those languages with less-developed histories (Byelorussian, Finno-Ugrian, Moldovan,
Paleo-Siberian, Yiddish) (Babtseva 1995; Smith 1995a, 1995b; Batsin 1993; Krasovitskaya
1993; Tkachenko 1993; Volkov 1993).
During the Stalin tenure, Russified formal education policies prohibited the use of
Armenian, Azerbaijani Turkish, Byelorussian, Moldovian and Ukrainian. In 1938, literacy
campaigns were conducted only in Russian and it became the mandatory language of in-
struction, Russian class size decreased and instruction hours increased. Russian language
teachers received a 15 percent raise, and professional journals and research institutes high-
lighted Russian language instruction. In the 1940s, Arabic and other languages with Latin
alphabets were changed to Cyrillic script, which was especially devastating to indigenous
education in Kyrgyzstan, Azerbaijan and Uzbekistan. Formal education suppression
accounted for public disuse of many languages since the 1950s. The Khrushchev era,
1953-1964, saw a limited resurrection of previously banned indigenous literature and
primary language education. However, during the Brezhnev Zastoi (stagnation), 1964-
1978, Russification policies intensified and National Schools all but completely lost their
indigenous character. Nonetheless, previous allowances plus a blossoming dissident
movement that illuminated inequities in human, religious and cultural rights formed the
foundation from which the various stages denoting social change eventually emerged
(Batsin 1993; Krasovitskaya 1993; Tkachenko 1993; Volkov 1993; Raby 1992).
By the 1980s, non-Russian languages “enjoyed the right to freedom but not the right to
equality” (Smith 1995a: 46). Formal education allowed some non-Russians to maintain
their linguistic/cultural heritage by fostering formal and nonformal multicultural folk
education in terms of dance, music, costume, and traditional food. However, in so doing, it
largely ignored or misinterpreted more substantial aspects of the culture. The elaborate
network of pioneer/komsomol multicultural education could not be considered avenues in
which linguistic, historical and cultural appreciation was manifest. Indeed, the
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predominance of Russian as a necessary tool for academic, social and economic mobility
served as an important incentive for choosing Russian rather than National Schools, even if
National Schools offered a Russified curriculum and used Russian for instruction. This was
supported by a system where most secondary schools and all vocational, technical and
other higher education institutions were taught only in Russian. Indeed, by 1986, the non-
Russian RSFSR school population was 19 percent of the overall population, yet only 9
percent attended National Schools (Tkachenko 1993). Consequently, the Russified formal
educational system became a vehicle for the cultural extinction of non-Russian ethnic
groups.
At National Schools, indigenous language/culture was taught as single subjects, and
often, students studied two or more languages prior to learning their own. By 1980, few
non-Russian languages were taught beyond the third grade, and access was severely
limited. For example, in 1986, out of 100,000 schools in the Kyrgyz capital, only one high
school taught Kyrgyz as a subject (Krasovitskaya 1993; Rywkin 1992; Akaev 1991;
Kagedan 1991).
3
 By 1988, only 19 national languages were taught beyond first grade, of
which eleven concluded at the third grade. Post-third grade language instruction occurred
in Tuvins (seventh grade), Yakut (ninth grade), Bashkir and Tatar (eleventh grade), and
Georgian (university). By the demise of the Soviet Union, despite the growth in the
number of National Schools, these schools remained “national” in name only, as they
shared a common curriculum with Russian schools and were distinguishable only by their
majority of non-Russian students. In the post-Soviet era, despite the magnitude of social
change, the Institute of National Problems in Education encouraged cultural revitalization,
but only within a Russified foundation.
3.2 Nonformal Education: Agent for Revitalization
In the 1980s, in a period called the Khrushchev thaw, a new generation matured whose
parents were allowed limited access to indigenous language/culture, yet who themselves,
were forbidden such education. Fueled by memories of persecution and encouraged by
dissident movements, ethnic language/culture symbolized deep-rooted identities that were
resilient to change. Cultural identity was the cornerstone of the Estonian, Georgian,
Latvian, Lithuanian, Moldovan and Ukrainian socio-cultural independence movements.
This new generation became the first to experience the dichotomy of Russification in
formal education and nationalism in nonformal education.
Despite intense Russification pressure, many non-Russians were able to maintain
elements of their linguistic/cultural heritage via nonformal education. In the late eighties,
these nonformal channels often served as the rallying force for Eurasian revitalization and
some nationalistic movements, as well. A vast array of indigenous cultural centers, clubs,
and after-school activities explicitly promoted revitalization. These institutions not only
taught cultural artifacts that reinforced traditional culture, but through linguistic/cultural
literacy training, moral education and anti-drug/alcohol education, they helped to counter
the alienation that resulted from decades of Russian colonialization (Singh 1995).
In the late eighties, a proliferation of nonformal nationality-based groups emerged
including three hundred such groups in Kazakhstan alone. Other examples included Alifbo
[alphabet] Uzbekistan and Turkmenian self-education manuals; Ana Tili articles in Ka-
zakhstan; Ecological Handbook Kwek Tiin (EarthBreath); Ecology camp in Elgai, Sakha
Republic, Ekology groups in Kyrgyzstan; Green Front in Kazakhstan; Islamic study groups
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in Central Asia; “Kitchen meetings” of the Georgian National Liberation (1978-1989);
National Cultural Centers for indigenous in Nikolaevsk-na-Amur, Groups; Nenets cultural
revival programs; Khabarovsk Krai T.V. program, “People of the Amur”; Long-Distance
Education via television and computers; Spontaneous and Non-Spontaneous Youth
Groups; and children’s “singing revolution”, in which nationalist songs were sung in their
native language immediately upon independence (Yegorov-Crate 1995; INTERCOM
1994; Kuratov 1993; Richards 1993; Rwykin 1992; Sadomskaya 1991; Central Asia File
1989; Gudava & Gudava 1989).
Between 1988-1991, nonformal education supported the revival of indigenous
language/culture as a key element of nationalistic movements in the Armenian Pan-
National Movement (ArCP), Association of Korean Organization of the Northern
Caucasus, Azerbaijani Popular Front (APF), Buryat-Mongol People’s Party, Byelorussian
Popular Front (Adradzhen’ne), Estonia Popular Front; Islamic Party of Tajikistan
(Rastakhiz), Iugˆr society of Komi-Permiak; Latvian National Independence Movement;
Latvian Popular Front; Moldovan Popular Front, Nationalist Kazakh Alash Party and Azat
movement, Regional Association of Small Peoples of Chukota and Kolyma, Ainu Council
on Kurils/Sakhalin, and the Autonomous Okrugs of the Evenko, Koryak-Evenki (Magadan
Oblast), Ukraine Popular Front (Rukh), and Uzbek Popular Front (Birlik). In addition,
Russian national consciousness explosion ranged from cultural revival to Pamyat, the
Russian militant-right movement, which sought to minimize the consciousness assertions
of non-Russian ethnic peoples (Lallukka 1995; Huttenbach 1993; Zaprudnik 1993; Dunlop
1991; Trapans 1991).
4
It was also through nonformal education that post-Soviet multiculturalism occurred.
Many Russian merchants used nonformal education to learn non-Russian languages in
order to deal more effectively with American, European, Central Asian, and Asian traders
as well as with migrant workers from throughout Eurasia and the world. In regions
demanding titular language proficiency, Russians and others participated in nonformal
education projects as a means for acquiring citizenship and language competency.
Indigenous language/culture retention hinged upon what Paulston (1980: 16) referred to
as the “conceptualization of liberating nonformal education”, in which indigenous used
nonformal language education to lay the foundation from which cultural independence was
eventually received (Petherbridge-Hernandez & Raby 1993: 1). Brubaker (1994) defines
this process as a “resilient ethnonational and ethnoreligious identity structure than could
survive over centuries even in ethnically mixed environments” (p. 3). Throughout Eurasia,
minority cultures that experienced some level of glasnost during eras of cultural and
linguistic suppression, and survived through nonformal, often clandestine channels,
eventually supported nationalist movements that were instrumental in cultural and political
revitalization.
3.3 Revitalized Formal Educational Policy
Influenced by the politics of perestroika and the openness of glasnost, nonformal move-
ments (1986-1991) asserted linguistic/cultural revitalization policies to define, maintain
and secure their newly found independence. To some extent, the void left by communism
was filled by ethnic fever. As non-Russians created opportunities to resurrect and explore
their language/culture, they defined laws to maintain, legitimize and perpetuate indigenous
158 TC, 1996, 2(2)
literacy and through it, an independent state. Implementation of revitalized policy was,
however, dependent upon the educational strengths in the formal sectors.
Language laws initially provided permission for, and encouraged indigenous language
literacy on all levels of education, and after independence, defined indigenous languages as
the lingua franca for a particular region. Language laws became concrete symbols of
resistance to past and future forms of Russification and neo-colonialization. These laws
also disassociated education with communism, Soviet teaching materials and pedagogical
methods. Between 1989-1990 (but as early as 1972 in Georgia), a series of language laws
were enacted that included: 1) giving indigenous languages official status; 2) allowing the
indigenous language to become the language of government administration, including
international communication; 3) mandating that people who provide public services must
demonstrate a working knowledge of that language; and 4) delineating provisions for
linguistic minority groups (Gudava & Gudava 1989; Kagedan 1991; Clemens 1993).
In response, the Supreme Soviet 1989 Language Law allowed native languages to
become official in their territories, although maintained Russian as the official language of
inter-ethnic communication, and hence as the language of instruction in formal education.
Some regions enforced compromise bilingual language laws which emphasized both
Russian and titular indigenous languages, such as the August 1992 Tatarstan Sovereignty
Law, the 1992 Tuva and Sakha constitutional language laws, the 1993 Buryat language
law, and the revised Kazakh June 1992 draft constitution.
5
 Other regions held steadfast to
their insistence of having the titular language as the official language, such as the 1989
Taiji State Language Law; the August 1991, Declaration of the Ukrainian Primary
Language Law, and the 1991 Kyrgyz Language Law (Nationalities Papers 1995; Clemens
1993).
While the road to independence coincided with cultural and linguistic revival, overall
success varied and was tenuous as a result of divergent populations. The demise of the
Soviet Union left multicultural, multilingual states that sought preservation of a single
culture rather than harmonious interaction among cultures. What could have been the
culmination of nationalistic development instead became the beginning of a new stage that
encompassed ethnicity related tensions and conflict.
3.4 Multicultural Conflict
An ideal harmonious multicultural state was countered by the reality of xenophobia,
persecution and genocide found throughout the affected regions. The mono-ethnic illusion
which supported cultural revival justified human rights violations as a way for indigenous
peoples to avoid minority status once again. Some opposed bilingualism because it could
lead to a loss of indigenous groups’ political & economic leverage. In the post-Soviet era,
ethnic hostilities and economic conflicts, both perceived and real, were equally responsible
for redefining ethnic relations and for forcing a reconciliation of multiculturalism and
preservation of minority identities while not losing national affinity. The more the titular
ethnic group felt threatened by others, the more likely it was to erect legal barriers in the
form of language/citizenship laws. For example, Estonia and Latvia had language and
residency requirements for citizenship that affected approximately 20 percent of the
population, while Kazakhstan, (42% Kazakhs and 32% Russians) had duel
citizenship/language policies (Metcalf 1996; INTERCOM 1994; Juviler 1992).
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Struggles ensued among Russian majority, Russianized indigenous and nationalistic
indigenous all of whom had conflicting agendas that resulted in instability and in some
instances, violence. Internal and external migration also redefined social relationships and
increased ethnic tensions. As the number of Russian emigrants increased, particularly from
Central Asian and the North Caucuses, those who remained became the weaker minority.
Often, emigrants were the most educated and well-trained workers in the region, and their
loss in terms of a knowledge base was devastating. At the same time, as these groups
resettled, often in Siberia, they augmented a local Russian/ Slavic power-base. As a result,
language preference became divided along rich/poor, rural/urban and center/periphery
terms (Smith 1995a; Brubaker 1994; RA Report 1994; Mitchneck 1993; Izvestiya 1992).
Revitalization efforts had three repercussions. The first involved an opposition to learn
indigenous languages despite the passing of language laws. Before 1991, Russians living in
non-Russian territories were rarely literate in indigenous languages, even if indigenous
people were a large percentage of the population. In 1987, only 0.7 percent of Russians
living in Kazakhstan knew Kazakh, and until 1990, National Schools in Uzbekistan taught
more Russian than Russian schools taught Uzbek. Many non-titular people who were
pressured to learn new languages, blatantly resisted it. Tatarstan Republic presents a
typical pattern. In 1992, laws legalized bilingualism, yet in 1993, 77 percent of Tatars
knew Russian, but only 7 percent of Russians knew Tatar. Similarly, Russian still
predominated in schools in Kazakhstan (1992), more than fifty percent of Russians in
Lithuania were illiterate in Lithuanian (1993), and 12 million Russians in Ukraine still
refused to learn Ukrainian (1994). Despite a five-year transition period, many non-titular
people claimed that they needed 15-20 years of transition time before the law is enacted.
Indeed, many language laws were only moderately enforced due to insufficient number of
teachers, texts, dictionaries and incentives. Lack of support for bilingualism intensified
tensions in Belarus, Latvia, Moldova and the Republics of Tatarstan and Tuva as the titular
population, realized an inability to use their own language for everyday activities (Chinn &
Roper 1995; Smith 1995b; Statteika 1995; Mongush 1993; Vebers 1993; Zaprudnik 1993).
The second repercussion involved Russianized non-Russians who were physically and
psychologically removed from their cultural foundations and socialized in Russianized
boarding schools and/or institutes of higher education. These individuals were alienated
from their cultural roots by ignorance of their own culture, and from the Russian culture
due to an inability to assimilate completely. In the midst of social change, many
Russianized non-Russians were among the first to protest against changing the status quo
(Brubaker 1994; Nokolaeva 1993).
The final result involved competition for limited power and self-preservation by non-
titular minority ethnic groups who often opposed titular indigenous groups. Multicultural
conflict increased when Russians became secondary level minorities in Belarus,
Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan and Turkmenistan and tertiary level minorities in Georgia, Latvia,
Moldova, and Tajikistan. In the Siberian Far East, Korean and Chinese migrant workers
not only displaced indigenous peoples but also threatened historic secondary minorities
like the Ukrainians, Germans and Poles. Secondary and other minority groups oftentimes
were forced to learn two or more languages while simultaneously trying to preserve their
own. A continued depressed economy made educational revitalization of the titular ethnic
group difficult at best and educational revitalization of secondary minorities all the more
impossible (Gordon 1993; Khisamutdinov 1993; Shakhrai 1993).
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From 1994 to 1996, eighteen out of the twenty-one former Republics and 180
“hotspots” experienced culture-based conflict to which secondary minorities were
especially vulnerable. Conflict varied from Lithuanian protests (stemming from a lack of
church facilities) to economic polarization in Siberia to ethnic rebellions and wars in
Georgia, Moldova, Azerbaijan, Armenia, Turkmenistan, Uzbekistan, Tajikistan and North
Caucasus area.
7
 As Kassof (1994) claimed, the efforts to “protect minorities and to reduce
conflict emphasized the value of culture and group identity” and in the process “often
reinforced, rather then blurred the lines of demarcation between populations and actually
deepened social and political rifts” (p. 1).
4 Institutionalization of Revitalization Components
As educational policy evolved, the problem to satisfy demands for all levels of language
instruction for different ethnic groups increased. Two patterns emerged. The first, mono-
lingual/cultural education, was stressed in Estonia, Georgia, Latvia, Lithuania, and the
Ukraine whereby all ethnic groups were encouraged and/or forced by law to become
literate in the indigenous language. Some laws made opposition to learning the titular
language illegal. Alienation by and persecution of non-titular groups resulted, and little
changed, except for now “Germans in Kazakhstan no longer fight with Moscow, but with
Alma Ata’s policy of Kazakhstanization, as one majority had been substituted for another”
(Anweiler 1993: 7; Vinokurova 1995). The second pattern, bilingual/bicultural education,
provided, at least in theory, equals status for numerically strong indigenous ethnic groups,
such as in Kazakhstan, Moldova, Sakha Republic and Tatarstan Republic. For the most
part, the titular population was almost entirely bilingual and was pushing for more
equitable bilingual laws. In the best of conditions, the reality of bilingualism/biculturalism
remained dubious and in areas where there remained a high degree of indigenous illiteracy,
such a system became separate and unequal.
Institutionalization of revitalization components was subject to economic problems that
plagued Eurasia, and eventually became impossible without monetary, technological and
human resources. As a result, the old system often prevailed (with Russian language in-
struction), not out of choice, but because a new educational system could not be main-
tained financially. In particular, three problems hindered revitalization efforts: 1) inade-
quate structural foundation; 2) inadequate educational foundation; and 3) a debate over
orthography.
An inadequate structural foundation existed in the quantity and quality of educational
facilities. After 1992, there were not enough schools to physically handle the growing
number of students, making schools that operated on second and even third shifts quite
common. In many regions, implorable working conditions included numerous schools with
no gas connections, no running water or central heat, in capital repairs, and due to unpaid
bills, many educational institutions had no electricity. Reports of mismanaged funds further
complicated these problems (Raby 1992). In addition, as education received a smaller
percentage of federal funding, poorer paid teachers and impoverished conditions
proliferated. During 1996 alone, 3,300 educational establishments in Russia participated in
a continuous strike for back wages, and better wages and working conditions
(Okoneshnikova 1996, May 30, 1996, October 8).
The inadequate educational foundation included an acute lack of adequately trained
ethnic language teachers, ethnic language texts, dictionaries and teaching materials, a
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historical foundation that included ethnic language illiteracy, and an inproportionate
number of ethnic students entering and graduating from institutes of higher education,
particularly from pedagogical institutes. These inadequacies hindered many Eurasian
ethnic groups from educating themselves. It was difficult to get indigenous students to
enroll in and complete higher education at rates near the proportion of their population. In
many regions, indigenous students received an inferior education. This resulted in the
perpetuation of negative stereotypes which fed into ethnic tensions. High unemployment
rates of recent higher education graduates further compounded the situation.
While many universities created special faculties for indigenous and Asian studies,
indigenous language/culture specializations were still lacking in many pedagogical
institutes, and multicultural education was even more rare. The consequences of inade-
quate indigenous education ranged from reader preference for newspapers in Russian (such
as in Belarus) to higher education still being offered in Russian or in the newly preferred
language, English (such as in Kahzar University, Azerbaijan).
8
A debate over orthography prevented significant educational change in some Central
Asian countries and in Moldova. The question of returning to Latin or Cyrillic script
became a symbol of opposition to Soviet cultural imperialism in the late eighties. Many
Eurasian alphabets were changed into Latin script in the twenties and thirties and then later
changed into Cyrillic script in the forties. These changes delayed literacy attainment of a
whole generation. Currently, many Central Asian nationalists want to return to Latin rather
than Arabic Script since only a few can decipher early manuscripts in the original Arabic.
Resolutions to change the alphabet to Latin script along with revived native-based
terminologies, were passed in Azerbaijan, Uzbekistan and Turkmenistan. As a result of the
1995 Latin Alphabet Law, Azerbaijan street signs, newspapers and schoolbooks now use
Latin script. In Moldova, a similar resolution awaits full implementation (Chinn & Roper
1995; Smith 1995a; INTERCOM 1994).
5 Revitalization Examples of Success
Given that social change can require generations to take root, Eurasian bilingual seeds
planted in 1992 may, in the future, produce fully revitalized languages/cultures.
Throughout Eurasia, programs were initiated in which one level of formal indigenous
language/culture instruction was added annually combined with nonformal language
education via clubs and media supplements. For example, in 1991 Kazak was taught as a
subject in kindergarten and 1st grade, and by 1993, Kazak was taught up to 3rd grade and
as a graduate specialization in Kazak studies. The Kazak press simultaneously augmented
Kazak literacy education with a daily column. Indeed, throughout Eurasia, newspapers
printed in both indigenous and minority languages gained popularity.
In general, revitalization efforts did enable a growth in formal education languages from
forty-four languages offered at some level in 1986 to sixty-six by 1990. In addition, a
plethora of nonformal educational avenues were implemented. Elements of success were
not limited to titular populations, but occurred among other minority groups as well. In
1993, the widely attended conference National School: Concept and Technology for
Development Seminar reiterated a direct link between education, language acquisition and
ethnic self-identity, which in turn has affected educational policy throughout Eurasia.
Table 1 highlights some examples of success as defined by access to indigenous
language/culture education.
162 TC, 1996, 2(2)
6 Conclusion
The phenomena discussed in this article were not case specific. Each case corroborated a
process whereby ethnic cultures experienced some periods of linguistic/cultural glasnost
during eras of political suppression and used nonformal, often clandestine channels to
socialize this knowledge from one generation to another. In this process, the critical stage
was not desire for independence but rather an implementation of altered minority/ majority
configurations.
Over the past decade, the Eurasian countries of the former Soviet Union experienced
similar transformational patterns with respect to education and ethnicity revitalization.
Each country had prominent ethnic populations with strong revitalization agendas who
struggled to preserve their language and culture from assimilation and repression. Upon
independence, revitalization efforts, while plentiful, were hampered by the reality of post-
independent multilingual/cultural populations that forced indigenous ethnic groups to
contend with both their own revitalization efforts and the often conflicting agendas of other
ethnic groups.
Eurasian countries depicted a dichotomy between forces that promoted revitalization
efforts (i.e. formal and nonformal education) and those that undermined such efforts (i.e.
the realities of multilingual/multicultural conflict). Major obstacles included: a) ability of
people to change political affiliations quicker than the ability to erase the effects of
centuries of Russification, b) nonexistent structural, economic and educational foundations
for indigenous education, and c) splintering of multiethnic minority groups within a region,
including Russians and Russianized indigenous, each with their own vested interests.
Complicating the entire process was the inability of the government to provide the
necessary elements of economic prosperity and domestic tranquility to support a social
system in which revitalization could thrive. Current elections indicated that although
cultural revitalization may evoke change, it may not be enough to sustain it. Nationalist
movements that led sovereignty campaigns against Soviet Moscow suffered election
defeats in Belarus, Lithuania, Moldova, regions of Russia and the Ukraine. What was once
a rallying cry for change became an obstacle for economic growth and development.
As English became the preferred international language that linked Russians, indige-
nous populations, migrant workers, and international aid, the decision to invest in
indigenous revitalization efforts has been questioned. The growing prevalence of pidgin
languages (Russian and titular), especially in Azerbaijan, Kazakhstan and the Ukraine,
were indicative of transformations occurring within society itself. While pidgin languages
were not officially sanctioned, (i.e. they were not taught in the formal educational nor in
the nonformal educational sectors) they have popular support via verbal communication.
Their future impact should not be ignored.
In conclusion, the primary issue under study was one of survival. Survival of a revitali-
zed culture required accentuation of a single language/culture in deference to the needs of
all others, often in the form of language laws. A divergent multiplicity of language, culture,
religion, and political orientation fragmented society and escalated ethnic-based conflict.
The issue of altered majority/minority relations is central to understanding the relationship
between revitalization, maintenance and ethnic-based conflict. The manner in which these
relations is dealt will determine the success or failure of the revitalized Eurasian case
studies.
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Table 1: Examples of Linguistic/Cultural Revitalization
9
REGION PRE-1991 POST-1991
Belarus Polish was banned from schools in 1831. 1993, 305 Polish students studied Polish as a sub ject.
Buryatia
Republic
Official subject (1993). In 1993, Buryat Pedagogical In stitute had 105 graduates who chose to
teach in rural areas to help promote Buryat cul ture. 1995 opening of the Ivol ga Datsan Spiritual
Training School.
Chukhota
Autonomous
Okrug
No native language/culture curriculum Creation of 57 general education schools, a pedagogical colle ge and vocational school in
Provideniya and Anadry, and a cultural center in Anadry, all of which incorporated a curri culum
that stressed Chukhota culture and la nguage (1992).
Gorno-Altai
Republik
As a result of the “One Language Law” (1993), an elementary Altai children's dic tionary was
published, “Altai Language in Pictures” (1994) to revitalize Altai language/culture.
Kamchatka
Oblast
2nd Annual Itelmen Scholar Conference stressed Itelmen and Kamchadal ethnic non formal
efforts as well as bilingual education (1995). Itelmen textbook was pu blished (1996).
Kazakhstan Less than 2,500 of 9,000 Kazakh primary schools offered
Kazakh as second language.
Law was passed to substantially increase teaching of Kazakh annually (1994).
Magadan Oblast 21 schools revived study of Evenki language; Magadan Teachers Conti nuing Education
Institute offered workshops on Evenki language tea ching and textbook crea tion (1992).
Moldova 10% of kindergartens used Romanian as prima ry
language (1989). Romanian was a “foreign language” in
higher education.
71% of all secondary schools taught Romanian as primary language (1993).
Primorski Krai No language textbooks 17 indigenous language textbooks (1993).
Sakha
Republic
Pre-1963, Yakut was primary language of instruction,
95% used Yakut at home and to a lesser extent outsi de of
the home (1991).
1992 teaching Yakut was permitted in rural areas. 1994, 400 rural tea chers and 200 urban
teachers are bilingual; Yakut is offered at the uni versity, at 600 primary and secondary schools.
1995 an Ecological Yakut language primer was distributed to all 32 regions of Sakha Republic.
Tatarstan
Republic
40% illiteracy rate (1980) 33% literacy rate (1993) with Tatar offered at schools, gymnasia, as a subject at the uni versity, a
Tatar newspaper. 1996 agreement to re-open Tatar Cultural Cen ter which was closed in 1941.
Udege Okrug No Udege language textbooks Udege language alphabet and textbooks created (1993). Nonformal edu cation for langua-
ge/culture combined with eco-tourist ventures (1995).
Ukraine No Ukrainian or Polish language schools 14 Ukrainian language schools (1992); 10 Polish schools (1993)
Uzbekistan 1994 – Uzbek as a state language. University lectures increasingly being read in Uz bek; Nizami
Ganjawi Pedagogical Institute being pressured to train more indi genous teachers.
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Notes
1. Post 1991, numerical representation within the general Russian population is Tatars (3.8%), Yakuts
(0.3%) and Tuvians (0.1%). Within individual republics the ethnic composition is 48.5% Tatar / 32%
Russian; 33.4% Yakut / 50.3% Russian and 64.3% Tuvian / 32% Russian. Estonia contained 500,000
Russians plus other numerically smaller minorities including Ukraini ans, Poles and Central Asian
migrant workers (Pettai 1993; Metcalf 1996; INTERCOM 1994; Batalden & Batalden 1993; Mongush
1993; Chinn 1993; Gordon 1993).
2. See for example the Russian/Mongolian School in Irkutsk and the Vladivostok Russian/Chinese schools
(Khisamutdinov 1993).
3. No primary schools used Kyrgyz as a primary language, and 1/5 of all students attending voca tional-
technical schools were Kyrgyz. As a result of the native language campaign, initiated by Kyrgyz
writer/advocate Chingiz Aitmatove, serveral kindergartens became bilingual in 1991.
4. In the Primorskii Krai, Elena Sosio, an ethnic Nenets scholar coordinated cultural revival pro grams for
30,000 diverse indigenous peoples (Okoneshnikova 1993).
5. The Kazakh policy was altered from a Kazakh-centric policy, while the Uzbek bilingual policy in the
1989 “Law of the Uzbek Soviet Socialist Republic on Languages” was later altered to echo Birlik’s
demands for Uzbek dominance. The multilingual Moldovan policy of the September 1989 revised
language law gave cultural concessions to Modovans, Russians and other ethnic groups including
Ukrainians, Gagauz, Bulgarians and Jews (Chinn 1993).
6. The Estonian 1992 Constitution decreed that only citizens can vote and that non-Estonians, including
Russians and others who lived in Estonia for generations, were not eligible for citizen ship. A 1993
amendment allowed non-citizens to vote in local elections. In the meantime, the amendment has been
replaced with a law that allows non-Estonians to vote after five years of citizenship beginning in 1992.
In addition, an “Alien Law” now regulates the annual number of new citizens.
7. Instances of violence included the following: (a) Tiblisi April 1989 massacre which started as a protest
against inequitable minority policies, including the loss of status for the Georgian langua ge, and
continues today with conflicts between the Georgians, Ossetians and Mingrelians; (b) Alma-Alta riots,
1986, fueled by a revitalized minority consciousness, “Kazakhstan for Kazakhs” that opposed
replacement of Kazakh First Party Secretary by a Russian; (c) Ferghana Valley riots, June 1989,
between Uzbeks and Meskhetians who both wanted autonomy, resulted in the evacua tion of 11,000 –
60,000 Meshketians (Turkish speaking Muslims) into Russian refugee camps; (d) Tajik civil war which
started in February 1990, when Tajik nationals protested against an increased number of Armenian
migrants; (e) Moldova conflicts, 1990 when Slavic majority in Trans-Dniester and the Khalky of
Moldova both attempted succession from Moldova; (f) Nagor no-Karabagh continued conflict between
Armenians and Azeris; (g) Kyrgyzstan conflict in 1993 in the northern territory between Turkic and
Mongol clans accentuated ethnic conflict between Kyrgyz and the one million Russians in the area; (h)
Chechnya civil war, 1994 violence exploded and currently the entire North Caucasus region is extremely
volatile.
8. Personal interview with Inna Gzudskaya, Shafiyeva Firangiz and Zeinalova Zemfiza, Kahza r
University, Baku, Azerbaijan, November 11, 1994 (see also Sukhnat 1993).
9. Babtseva (1995), Chinn & Roper (1995), Lallukka (1995), Lannon (1995), Yegorov-Crate (1995),
Okoneshnikova (1993), Sukhnat (1993), Tkachenko (1993), Vinokurova (1995).
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